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IN THE SUPREViE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 19069 
EFRAIN ROJOS HARO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
f BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether defendant may challenge the exclusion of 
his hearsay testimony for the first time on appeal when he 
neither objected to the trial court's ruling, stating the grounds 
therefor, nor informed the trial court of any permissible purpose 
of the excluded testimony. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding defendant's hearsay testimony. 
3. Whether defendant's hearsay testimony was 
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
4. Whether the exclusion of defendant's hearsay 
testimony constituted reversible error. 
5. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish 
that defendant committed aggravated assault within the meaning of 
§ 76-5-103 (1), Utah Code Ann. (1978). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRQVISION, STATUTES. ORDINANCES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978) 
76-5-102. Assault.--Cll Assault is: 
Cal An attempt, with unlawful force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
or 
(bl 
immediate 
injury to 
( 2) 
A threat, accompanied by a show of 
force or violence, to do bodily 
another. 
Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978) 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault.--(1) 
A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assa_ul t as defined in section 
76-5-102 
Cal Hii intentionally causes serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(bl He uses a deadly weapon or such 
means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony 
of the third degree. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 (1977) 
RULE 61 
HARMLESS ERROR 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any rule or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, 
is ground for granting a new trial or other-
wise disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 61 (1977) 
77-35-20. Rule 20--Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court 
are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a 
party state his objections to the actions of 
the court and the reasons therefor. If a party 
has no opportunity to object to a ruling or 
order, the absence of an objection shall not 
thereafter prejudice him. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4 (1977) 
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RULE 4 
EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
A verdict. or finding shall not be aside, 
nor shall the ju9gment or decision based 
thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless 
(a) there appears of record objection to 
the evidence timely interposed and so 
stated as to make clear the specific 
ground of objection, and (bl the court 
which passes upon the effect of the error 
or errors is of the opinion that the admitted 
evidence should have been excluded on the 
ground statep and probably had a substan-
tial in bringing about the 
verdict or finding. However, the court 
in its discretion, and in the interests 
of justice, may review the erroneous 
admission of evidence even though the 
grounds of the objection thereto are 
correctly stated. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 5 (1977) 
RULE 5 
EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless Cal 
it appears of record that the proponent of 
the evidence either made known the substance 
of the evidence in a form and by a method 
approved by the judge, or indicated the 
substance of the expected evidence by 
questions indicating the desired answers, 
and Cb) the court which passes upon the 
effect of the error or errors is of the 
opinion that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence 
_in bringing about a different verdict or 
finding. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(4) Cb) (1977) 
RULE 63 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE EXCLUDED--EXCEPI'IONS 
Evidence of a statement which is made 
other than by a witness while testifying at 
thP hearing offered to prove the truth of the 
matter stated is hearsay evidence and 
inadmissible except: 
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(4) Contemporaneous Statements and 
Statements Admissible on Ground of Necessity 
Generally. A statement (a) which the judge 
finds was made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition which 
the statement narrates, described or 
explains, or Cb) which the judge finds 
was made while the declarant was under 
stress of a nervous excitement caused 
by such perception, or (c) subject to 
Rule 64, if the declarant is unavailable 
as a witness, a written statement 
narrating, describing or explaining 
an event or which the judge 
finds was by the declarant at a 
time when the matter had been recently 
perceived by him and while his r€collection 
was clear, and was made in good faith 
prior to the commencement of the action; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Efrain Rojos Haro, was charged by 
information with one count of Attempted Criminal Homicide -
Second Degree Murder, a second degree felony, and one count of 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony. A jury trial was 
conducted on January 5-6, 1983, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding. 
The jury convicted defendant of two counts of 
Aggravated Assault. Defendant was sentenced to serve two 
consecutive zero-to-five year terms in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Just after midnight, on August 31, 1982, defendant's 
neighbor, Phillip Tatum, was awakened by the sound of voices 
talking outside his bedroom window CT. 13>. Mr. Tatum looked OL 
the window and saw a group of about six people passing down the 
sidewalk (T. 13). Tatum sat back down on his bed; there was 
-4-
;ilence for five or ten minutes and then Tatum again heard the 
'oices of people passing on the sidewalk outside his window CT. 
6-171. There was another lull, lasting about five minutes, 
olJowed by an explosion CT. 18). Mr. Tatum rushed to the 
•indow, and in the light of a street lamp CT. 15) Tatum observed 
lefendant standing over Carlos and Miguel Ibarra from eight to 
.en feet directly in front of his window CT. 18). 
Defendant pointing a gun in the direction of the 
:barras, about a foot from Carlos CT. 21),- and defendant was 
;creaming at the Ibarras in a language Mr. Tatum could not 
mderstand CT. 8). Miguel was trying to drag Carlos away from 
lefendant CT. 18). Neither of the Ibarras carried anything in 
:heir hands CT. 111, and they made no response to defendant's 
;creams CT. 191. 
Defendant concluded his attack and bolted into his 
1partment CT. 9), leaving Carlos lying on the sidewalk bleeding 
rom a gunshot wound in the leg CT. 69). Mr. Tatum ran outside 
.o help Carlos, whom he believed was bleeding to death CT. 10). 
:arlos' wife, c. T. Ibarra, arrived at the scene a couple of 
1inutes later CT. 111. Carlos remained conscious at least until 
:he police arrived CT. 741; he was taken by ambulance to the 
remained there for a week to receive treatment for 
1is leg (Tr. 33). 
Defendant lived in the apartment next to Mr. Tatum's 
1tiµsrtment. Mr. Tatum was certain that it was defendant that he 
;a'-1 pointing a gun at the Ibarras CT. 12). Mr. Tatum knew the 
bartas on a casual basis, but he never had a conversation with 
-5-
them since they could not understand his language nor could he 
understand theirs. , 
About ten minutes after the shooting, defendant crawled 
.t 
out of one of the apartment windows into the backyard of his 
neighbor, Leon Cunningham (T. 58). Mr. Cunningham asked 
defendant what he was doing. Defendant replied that he had 
caught his girlfriend "messing around" and had shot the guy CT. 
60). Defendant over a fence and out of Cunningham's 
yard CT. 60). Mr. Cunningham went into his front yard where he 
saw the conunotion around Carlos Ibarra. Mr. Cunningham gave a 
statement to the police at that time (T. 61). 
At trial, Carlos Ibarra, the victim, testified that he 
knew defendant by sight and knew where he lived CT. 44). Carlos 
t 
,( 
.E 
'j 
E 
'I 
( 
stated that shortly after midnight on August 31, 1982, he and his 
.r 
brother, Miguel, decided to take a walk. 
·l 
house, they saw defendant standing with three Cuban men. Carlos 
t 
As they left their 
thought nothing of it, and Carlos and Miguel proceeded until they 
'i 
were about five feet in front of defendant. Defendant then 
pulled out his gun and shot Carlos. Neither Carlos nor Miguel 
attacked defendant prior to the shooting CT. 30-31). Carlos 
Ibarra fell to the ground and Miguel rushed to his aid. 
Defendant :continued to point his gun at the Ibarras and began 
screaming at them asking if they "wanted more" (T. 32). 
a 
1 
E 
r 
Defendant claimed, however, that at about 8:00 p.m. one 
August 30, 1982, while he was watching T.V. with his neighbor, .r 
Jesus Romero, he saw Carlos Ibarra peering in through his window 
(T. 89-91). Defendant then explained that Romero went outside to f 
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alk to Carlos and when Romero returned he was "a little bit 
xcited or something that" (Tr. 92). The prosecutor 
lee 
e 
s 
•bjected to allowing defendant to repeat what Romero told him; 
he trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel offered 
.o proof CT. 92), but continued to instruct defendant that 
,efendant could not relate the substance of the conversation 
.ecause it was hearsay CT. 94). 
Defendant ciaimed that as a result of his conversation 
·ith Romero he was afraid Carlos was planning either to "rob or 
ssault" him when he left his house CT. 94). At about 12:00, 
efendant went out to purchase cigarettes and took a gun with him 
T. 97-98). He claimed that while he was waiting for Romero to 
oin him outside his apartment, he saw the Ibarras at his back 
is 
nd knew they were going to jump him CT. 99). Defendant also 
there was a lead pipe two feet long CT. 109) in Miguel 
s 
Defendant asserted that he reacted barra's right hand CT. 99). 
'=Y shooting at the ground and that he did not intend to hit 
arlos (Tr. 100). Defendant stated he then stepped back some 
istance, told the Ibarras they got what they deserved, CT. 114-
15) and walked into his apartment CT. 102). He testified that 
e initially intended to stay in his apartment, but he feared 
hat the police would hurt him so he went out his back window 
nto his neighbor's yard CT. 102-103). He claims he told the 
in .e j ghbor he had some trouble with some guys on the street and had 
.hot one of them (T. 103) . 
there was testimony refuting virtually all of 
0 er:ndant's allegations. Carlos' wife testified that Carlos had 
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been home the entire afternoon, including around 8:00 p.m. on the 
30th CT. 123). Carlos testified that he had not told Jesus 
Romero that he intended to rob defendant (T. 44). Miguel 
testified that he was not carrying anything when he and his 
brother were walking on the morning of August 31st (T. 48). Mr. 
Tatum testified that he did not see anything in Miguel's hands. 
A police officer, Merrill Stuck, testified that he specifically 
checked Carlos and Mig.uel for weapons, and he found no weapons 
I 
either on their person or anywhere in their vicinity CT. 69-70). 
Both Miguel and Carlos testified that after the shooting 
defendant continued to point the gun in their direction and ask 
if "they wanted more" (Tr. 32, Tr. 4..8). Leon Cunningham 
testified that defendant stated he shot someone for "messing 
around" with his wife CT. 60). 
SUM!1ARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant neither objected to the trial court's ruling 
excluding defendant's hearsay testimony nor informed the trial 
court of any permissible purpose of the excluded testimony. 
Instead, defense counsel acquiesced in the court's ruling and 
continued to instruct defendant that the substance of the out-of-
court statement was hearsay. Under such circumstances, allowing 
defendant '.to now challenge the trial court's ruling would violatE 
the well-settled principle that a party cannot raise an issue for 
the first time on appeal, since the trial court was not given an 
opportunity to address defendant's concerns. 
The trial judge's decision to exclude the evidence wil 
not be upset, unless it is clear that the trial court abused its 
-8-
the 
r. 
'i 
iscretion and it is shown that the defendant was unfairly 
rejudiced by the In the instant case, the trial court 
ld not abuse its discretion because the evidence did not have 
1e necessary indicia of reliability to qualify as an exception 
) the hearsay rule. In addition, defendant was not unfairly 
:ejudiced by the exclusion because the essence of the statement 
admitted under the "state of" mind exception, and therefore 
1e self-defense that defendant sought to establish with 
) . 
1e excluded statement was adequately placed before the jury •• 
The testimony was not admissible under the excited 
:terance exception to the hearsay rule. The statement was not 
1de under the stress of nervous excitement brought about by the 
!rception of an event. In the instant case, the only indication 
1at the disturbing event ever occurred was defendant's testimony 
1ich was contradicted by other evidence. Therefore, the alleged 
ng it-of-court statement is inadmissible under the excited 
:terance exception to the Hearsay Rule. 
Any error by the trial court in excluding defendant's 
!arsay testimony was harmless. Defendant sought to admit an 
of-it-of-court statement that he claims would establish that he 
ng :ted reasonably in self-defense. Al though the substance of the 
ate!arsay statement was inadmissible, defendant was allowed to 
for!stify that as a result of the statement he feared that the 
an >arras were going to either assault or rob him. However, the 
.leged statement was made five hours before the shooting and 
was substantial evidence negating defendant's claim that 
ts' erl<'cl in self-defense. Therefore there is no reasonable 
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likelihood that if the substance of the statement was admitted it
12
l b 
would have altered the finding of the jury. 
·el at 
There is sufficient evidence to establish that 
T. 9 
defendant committed Aggravated Assault as defined in § 76-5-
>f Je 
103(1) Utah Code Ann. (1978). First, the uncontradicted 
establishes that defendant perpetrated the attack on the Ibarras
1
ouse 
using a gun, a deadly weapon. This, in itself, is enough to 
prove that defendant ..+>s guilty of aggravated assault under Utah .esti 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (b). In addition, the jury need not mder 
believe that defendant's claim that he did not intend to shoot 
Carlos Ibarra and there was substantial evidence contradicting 1ot I 
such a claim. In addition, there is substantial evidence in the ria: 
record from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the ,f ti 
gunshot wound in Carlos Ibarra's leg was a serious bodily injury·eas< 
Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction ria: 
of Aggravated Assault under § 76-5-103(1) (a). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED DEFENDANT'S 
HEARSAY TESTil-()NY. 
A. DEFENDANT CANNOT CHALLEN:JE ON APPEAL THE 
ay 
eco 
vid 
y q 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING. ase 
counsel at trial sought to elicit from ndi 
defendant, on direct examination, the substance of a statement li.ll 
allegedly made by Jesus Romero at approximately 8:00 p.m. on the 
day before the shooting. The trial court sustained the 
prosecutor's objection to this hearsay testimony (T. 92l. 
Defense counsel did not object to the trial court's ruling CT. 
-10-
xcl 
J 
\J I 
12J but continued to instruct defendant that defendant could not 
·elate the substance of the conversation "because that's hearsay" 
T. 93, 94). Defendant was allowed to testify that as a result 
>f Jesus Romero's alleged statement he felt the Ibarras were 
to either rob or assault him as soon as he left his 
touse (T. 94). 
Defendant on appeal alleges for the first time that his 
estimony should have 1been admitted as an excited utterance, 
mder an exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 63(4) Cbl, Utah 
:ules of Evidence Cl977l. (The new Utah Rules of Evidence did 
1ot become effective until September 1, 1983, after defendant's 
rial was completed.) Defendant speculates that in the absence 
,f the trial court's ruling he would have established that he 
easonably acted in self-defense and therefore the outcome of his 
rial would have been different. 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that a party 
ay challenge on appeal the exclusion of evidence only if the 
ecord shows that the party made known the substance of the 
vidence or indicated the substance of the anticipated evidence 
y questions indicating the desired testimony. In the instant 
ase, the substance of the excluded testimony was adequately 
ndicated by the questions asked. However, this Court in 
radford y. Alve¥ & Sons, Utah, 621 P.2d 1240 (1980), expanded 
requirements of Rule 5 by affirming the trial court's 
xclusion of hearsay testimony on the grounds that at trial the 
J .J ·,,tiff-appellant "did not make any offer of proof as to what 
'- J._,1,_c, woulcl be adduced, nor the purpose it would serve, as 
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required by Rule 5 Utah Rules of Evidence." .lJi. at 1243 
(emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, defendant was given ample 
opportunity to point out to the court that he believed Romero's 
statement was admissible under "the excited utterance exception" 
to the hearsay rule and that it was considered central to 
establishing that defendant acted in self-defense. Instead, 
defendant acquiesced t;:i the judge's exclusion ruling and 
repeatedly admitted that the statement was- inadmissible hearsay 
and inferred that the purpose of the excluded testimony could be 
accomplished by relating the effect that Romero's statement had 
on defendant's state of mind (T. 92-9Al. For defendant now to 
challenge the trial court's ruling violates the well-settled rule 
in this jurisdiction that absent exceptional circumstances a 
Uo 
qt 
cl 
P· 
e 
e 
0 
party cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. .s..ta.t.e 
y. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252 <1983): Wagner y. Olsen, 25 Utah a 
2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971). Since defendant has not alleged any 
exceptional circumstances justifying his failure to take 
advantage of the ample opportunities presented at trial to raise 
this claim, he is precluded from challenging the trial court's 
ruling. 
Court's language in Bradford, indicating that a 
party cannot challenge on appeal the trial court's exclusion of 
testimony unless that party informed the trial court of the 
purpose to be served by the testimony, is supported by Rule 20, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure <Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-20 
<1982) l, which provides: 
-12-
)€ 
ile 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of 
the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party state his 
objections to the actions of the court 
and the reasons therefore. If a party 
has no opportunity to object to a ruling 
or order, the absence of an objection 
shall not therefore prejudice him. 
us, although Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, did not expressly 
quire a contemporaneous objection to a trial court's ruling 
eluding testimony as _did Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1977), 
,,-
cases involving the admission of evidence, under Rule 20, Utah 
les of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's ruling in Bradford, 
party has a duty at trial to raise the legal grounds supporting 
e admissibility of excluded testimony and to inform the court of 
e purpose to be served by the excluded testimony. 
The application of Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal 
ocedure, to this case is clear. Because defendant had ample 
tJ: portunity to object to the trial court's exclusion of his 
arsay testimony on the grounds that the testimony was admissible 
an excited utterance and was central to defendant's claim of 
lf-defense, defendant's failure to do so precludes him from now 
se ising the issue on appeal. 
f 
This result is supported by solid policy 
nsiderations. The court in Rjce y. State, 567 P.2d 525 (Okl. 
. 1977), outlined several important reasons for such a rule. In 
i;;_e_, the prosecutor objected to testimony which the defendant 
ught to elicit on direct examination from her own witnesses. 
e court stated: 
The court, rightfully or wrongfully, 
sustained the State's motion. Defendant 
thereupon took no exception to the 
-13-
court's ruling. An exception here would 
have been no mere formality for by not 
taking it defendant apparently 
acquiesced in the court's ruling. Had 
an exception been taken argument could 
have been had with the chance of 
changing the court's mind. Since the 
exception was not taken, the trial court 
was denied an opportunity to correct 
itself. A prosecutor's objection to 
evidence introduced by the defendant 
does not preserve the record for 
defendant when the court rules adversely 
to defendant. 
.I..d. at 530 .1 
I 
These considerations are similar to those supporting 
the contemporaneous objection rule applied to cases in which the 
admission of evidence is challenged "on appeal. This Court 
recently in State y. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982), 
endorsed the following statement of the Kansas Supreme Court in 
State y. Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 P.2d 923, 927 (1975): 
The contemporaneous objection rule long 
adhered to this state requires timely 
and specific objection to admission of 
evidence in order for the question of 
admissibility to be considered on 
appeal. The rule is a statutory 
procedural tool serving a legitimate 
state purpose. By making use of the 
rule, counsel gives the trial court the 
opportunity to conduct the trial without 
using the tainted evidence, and thus 
avoid possible reversal and a new trial. 
Furthermore, the rule is practically one 
necessity if litigation is ever to be 
brought to an end. 
1 Under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a party would 
object rather than take exception to a trial court's ruling. In 
light of Rule 20's objection requirement, the elimination of any 1 
requirement to except to a trial court's rulings is obviously 
intended to leiminate superfluous exceptions when a timely and r 
specific objection has already been interposed and not to relieve 
a party of the duty to raise his or her concerns for the trial 
court's consideration. 
-14-
Cardell, 652 P.2d at 947. After noting that defendant Mccardell 
iled to make a specific_ objection to the admission of the 
allenged evidence, this Court further stated: 
This is clearly a case where a timely 
and specific objection would have 
afforded the trial court the opportunity 
to address [the defendant's) concerns 
and at the same time permit the State to 
proceed with the evidence most relevant 
to its case. A new trial should not be 
the result [the defendant's failure 
to provide rlhe trial court that 
opportunity. 
The considerations outlined by the court and this 
urt in Mccardell, apply to the instant case. By failing 
raise this claim at trial, and by repeatedly asserting that the 
was indeed hearsay, defendant acquiesced in the trial 
urt's exclusion of the testimony. The prosecutor's objection 
ould not preserve the issue for defendant because the 
osecutor's position was at odds with defendant's position and 
prosecutor's objection did not provide the trial court with 
e opportunity to address defendant's concerns. Defendant's 
ilure to provide the trial court with such an opportunity should 
t result in a new trial at the expense of finality 
nsiderati_ons and the conservation of already extended judicial 
sources. 
Also, the opportunity to conduct a trial using all 
nissible evidence is just as important as the opportunity to 
a trial without using tainted evidence. Finally, all of 
E 
considerations are in harmony with the previously cited rule 
•t a party cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. 
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Therefore, in compliance with Rule 20, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and this Court's ruling in Bradford y. Alvey 
now SJlrui, Utah, 621 P.2d 1240. <1980), defendant is precluded from 
challenging the exclusion of his hearsay testimony because he 
neither objected to the trial court's ruling stating the grounds 
therefor nor informed the trial court of any permissible purpose 
of the excluded testimony. 
B. COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING THE 
HEARSAY TESTIMONY. 
This Court has consistently held that the trial court's 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed 
unless there is a clear showing that the judge abused his 
discretion and that a party has been unfairly prejudiced. .1n 
Interest of s---J---, Utah, 576 P.2d 1280_ (1978); In re Baxter's 
Estate, 16 Utah 2d 2984, 399 P.2d 442 (1965); .s...e..e. .aJ..ao State y. 
Carlson, Utah 635 P.2d 72 <1982) ("clear showing" requirement.) 
Defendant has made no clear showing that the trial 
court abused its discretion by excluding his hearsay testimony or 
that defendant was unfairly prejudiced thereby defendant cites a 
passage from May y, Wright, 381 P.2d 601, 603-04 (Wash. 1963) 
inferring the passage stands for the proposition that unless the 
trial court. specifically addresses the excited utterance exception 
when excluding hearsay testimony the reviewing court may forgo any 
deference to the trial court's discretion. However, defendant's 
reliance on ..t:l.a.i'.r is misplaced. In May y, Wright, the 
Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court's admission of 
hearsay evidence. The court stated that merely because the 
-16-
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ridence was not admissible as a prior inconsistent statement, the 
i :ounds upon which the trial court had admitted the evidence, did 
>t preclude the upholding of the admission if the evidence was 
·operly admissible on another ground. The court then found that 
1e evidence was admissible under the excited utterance exception 
, the hearsay rule. In determining whether the statement was 
1de soon enough after the event in question to qualify as an 
:cited utterance the di:>urt recited the passage quoted by 
,fendant. The passage, in whole, reads: 
We realize that the Washington 
cases have permitted fluctuation as to 
the time element with regard to excited 
utterances. Fluctuation as to the time 
element is both proper and necessary, 
since the related requirements for 
establishing the admissibility of an 
excited utterance are quite flexible in 
nature. In the normal situation the 
trial court has exercised its discretion 
by either permitting or rejecting the 
admission of statements on the basis of 
their being excited utterances (often 
referred to by the label res gestaeli 
and on appeal this court has exercised 
some deference to the exercise of 
discretion by the trial court in 
applying a flexible standard. In the 
instant case, however, the comments of 
the trial court do not indicate a 
reliance upon the concept of excited 
utterance in ruling upon the question of 
admissibility. So consideration and 
.deference to an exercise of discretion 
by the trial court are not within the 
purview of this case • 
. at 603-604. The court concluded that a statement made twenty 
nutes after a fatal auto-pedestrian accident satisfied the time 
for an excited utterance. l..d. Thus, the passage 
)led by defendant stands only for the proposition that if the 
court does not address the time requirement of the excited 
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utterance exception at all the reviewing court may not defer to 
the trial court's decision on that matter. court does ll..Q 
suggest that the reviewing court should not defer to the trial 
court's decision on the admissibility of evidence, absent a clear 
showing of abuse of discretion. 
In the instant case, defendant does not demonstrate 
that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the 
defendant's hearsay The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding defendant's testimony because, as 
discussed .i.nf.L.a, the evidence lacked the indicia of reliability 
necessary to qualify it under the "&xcited utterance" exception. 
Also, defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the exclusion of 
the testimony since any error was harmless in view of the evidenc1 
admitted in support of the defendant's claim of self-defense and 
the overwhelming evidence adduced at trial establishing 
defendant's guilt. 
C. THE TESTIMJNY WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER 
AN EXCEPI'ION TO THE HEARSAY RULE BECAUSE 
IT LACKED THE INDICIA OF RELIABILITY. 
Hearsay testimony generally is excluded because the 
credibility of testimony is best tested when the witness 
under oath in open court and is subject to cross-examination. 
State y. Sanders, 27 Utah 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972); v. 
Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983); McCormick on Evidence § 245 C2c 
ea. 1972>. 
However, testimony that is otherwise hearsay may be 
admitted into evidence if it falls under an exception having 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and absent such 
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arantees, the testimony is inadmissible. State v. Martin, 686 
2d 937, 949 (N.M. 1984),; State y. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 
2rl 404 <1980); People y. Howard, 198 Colo, 317, 599 P.2d 899 
979); Rule 803(24), Utah Rules of Evidence (Supp. 1983), 
earsay statements are covered by this "catchall" exception only 
they have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" 
uivalent to those of the other exceptions.)2 The Robinson court 
ated unequivocally: '"Guarantees of reliability are and must be 
e key to open the door to the exceptions." 616 P.2d at 411. 
e court in Howard equally emphatically stated: "The trier of 
ct will only be permitted to receive hearsay testimony as 
idence only in those limited circumstances where the inherent 
liability of the hearsay clearly outweighs the strong policy 
asons for excluding it." 599 P.2d at 899. The exceptions dealt 
th in both Robinson and H.mi.a.L..d were, as here, established 
atutory exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
The statutory exception involved in the instant case, 
e excited utterance exception, is premised upon the theory that 
statement made while the declarant is under the influence of the 
e11t to the extent that his statement could not be the result of 
br ication, intervening actions, or in the exercise of choice or 
The new Rules of Evidence, though not in effect at the time of 
efendant's trial, reflect this Court's acknowledgement of the 
act that exceptions to the hearsay rule depend on circumstantial 
narantees of reliability that substitute for the oath and cross-
Xdmination. Although under the new rules a prior inconsistent 
is not hearsay, under the prior rules governing this 
r uceedi ng, such a statement was admissible only as an exception 
o Lhe hearsay rule and as such must have circumstantial 
uarantees of reliability. 
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judgment, has the necessary indicia of reliability to justify 
making an exception to the hearsay rule. State v. McMillan, 
588 P.2d 162, 163 <1978). In order to establish that the 
necessary indicia exist, the judge must find that the statement 
was made while the declarant was under the stress of a nervous 
excitement caused by the perception of some event. Rule 63(4) (bl 
Utah Rules of Evidence <1977). In the instant case, the only 
evidence that would suiPort a finding that Romero's statement was 
made under the stress of a nervous excitement is the defendant's 
testimony that Romero went outside to talk to Carlos and when he 
came back he was "a little bit exc_ited or something like that" (T, 
92). Indeed, there was evidence adduced indicating that Jesus 
Romero may not have seen or talked with Carlos Ibarra and the 
defendant's story might be nothing, but a self-serving fabricatioc 
(e.g. T. 44, 123). 
Romero's alleged comment to defendant clearly does not 
have the indicia of reliability contemplated by the exceptions to 
the hearsay rule; and the trial judge would have been justified in 
concluding that even if the alleged conversation had occurred, n 
Romero was not sufficiently under the stress of nervous excitement 
to allow his statements as an exception to the hearsay rule under 
the excitea utterance provision of Rule 63. 
D. ANY ERROR IN THE EXCLUSION OF THE 
HEARSAY TESTir-r:JNY WAS HARMLESS. 
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, provided that the 
exclusion of evidence shall not result in a reversal of a 
conviction unless the proponent of the evidence makes an adequate 
offer of proof and the reviewing court determines that "the 
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eluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence 
bringing about a different verdict or finding." Rule 61, Utah 
les of Civil Procedure, also provides: 
No error in either the admission or 
the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a 
new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take such ac;tion appears to the court 
inconsistent'with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
This Court in State y. Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 
3801 further stated: 
The mandate of our statute and the 
policy firmly established in our 
decisional law, is that we do not upset 
the verdict of a jury merely because 
some error or irregularity may have 
occurred, but will do so only if it is 
something substantial and prejudicial in 
the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there 
would haye been a different result. 
nphasis added.) 
Because essence of the hearsay testimony of self-
fense that defendant sought to elicit was subsequently admitted 
co evidence, and because defendant's claim of self-defense was 
1tradicted by substantial evidence adduced at the trial, there 
no reasonable likelihood that the admission of defendant's 
testimony would have resulted in defendant's acquittal. 
flpf ense counsel's questions were clearly intended to 
l< 'i 1 r om defendant testimony regarding an alleged statement 
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made by Jesus Romero at about 8: 00 p.m. on August 30th, indicatinsie 
that the Ibarras intended to rob or assault defendant if he left if 
his house. The trial court 'allowed defendant to testify that as aln 
result of Romero's statement he feared such an attack by the )ffi 
Ibarras. Significantly, however, in the intervening five hours, L9 
until he left his house, defendant did nothing to protect against Id 
an attack. Instead, he chose to leave his house armed with a gun. 
In fucther sri.ipport of his claim of self-defense, _m 
defendant claimed that the Ibarras him from behind, iu 
intending to jump him, and that Miguel was armed with a two-foot 
lead pipe. However, Mr. Tatum testified that, immediately after o 
the shooting, he saw nothing in Miguel Ibarra's hands. The 
investigating officers also searched in vain for any weapon on the 
Ibarras or in their vicinity. Therefore, in light of the time 
lapse between Romero's alleged statement and defendant's assault 
and because the Ibarras were unarmed at the time of the shooting m1 
there is no reasonable likelihood that if Romero's hearsay s 
testimony would have led the jury to conclude that defendant's t 
conduct was in self-defense. 
Therefore, any error in the trial court's exclusion of 
the hearsay was harmless, and defendant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
This Court has stated that a conviction will not be 
reversed for insufficient evidence unless the evidence, when 
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St 
Ci 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, "is 
1fficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
alnds llllJ.s.t have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
immitted the crime." State y. Royball, Utah, 689 P.2d 1338 
L984l. State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983) (emphasis 
: ldedl. 
1 • 
1€ 
Defendant claims that the evidence presented against 
. rn at trial was insuffdcient to support his conviction of two 
>unts of aggravated assault. 
Section 76-5-103(1) of the Utah Code Ann. (1978) 
ovides, in pertinent part: 
A person commits aggravated assault 
as defined in section 76-5-102 and: 
Cal He intentionally causes 
serious bodily injury to 
Cb) He uses a deadly weapon 
such means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury •••• 
mphasis added). Defendant does not contend that the evidence 
s insufficient to prove the elements of simple assault which are 
t out in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978) as follows: 
Assault is: 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
Cb) A threat, accompanied by a show 
.of immediate force or violence, to 
bodily injury to another •• 
Instead, defendant argues that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict under the two 
bsections of the aggravated assault statute. Defendant claims 
e evidence could not support a finding of aggravated assault 
cause the evidence "clearly indicates" that the defendant did 
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not intentionally shoot Carlos Ibarra and because no evidence was E 
introduced to indicate that defendant's use of force was likely tcr 
produce death or serious bodily injury. s 
Contrary to defendant's arguments there is substantial p 
and credible evidence to support the jury's verdict under either i 
subsection of the aggravated assault statute. Defendant's i 
argument fails because, in addition to the fact that subsections n 
(a) and Cb) read in disjunctive, subsection (b) is itself s 
composed of two disjunctive elements. Under that subsection a e1 
person is guilty of aggravated assault either if he uses a 
weapon .QI. such means or force likely to produce death or serious e 
bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(bl (1978). In the 
instant case, the evidence is uncontradicted, and defendant rr 
admits, that he used a gun to shoot Carlos Ibarra. Defendant's 
gun was certainly a deadly weapon within the statutory definition 1c 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1) (1953), as amended. Therefore, 
there was a sufficient showing to support a conviction of lg 
Aggravated Assault under§ 76-5-103(bl. 
Additionally, the evidence was sufficient to establish 
that defendant either intended to shoot Carlos Ibarra, or that he .i 
intended to shoot both the Ibarras. The testimony of either .i 
Carlos or Miguel Ibarra, or from eyewitness accounts of IW 
defendant's actions and words, establish that defendant certainly!' 
possessed the requisite intent at the time of the assault. Jr1 
Defendant testified, however, that he did not intend to 1t. 
shoot Carlos, but only reacted to a perceived threat by shooting 
at the ground. There was sufficient evidence supporting the exact'"' 
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>osite conclusion that the Ibarra brothers (Miguel and Carlos) 
e unarmed and made no ?ttempt to assault defendant prior to his 
ault upon them. The evidence also indicated that after the 
•rovoked shooting defendant stood over Carlos and continued to 
ve the gun at the Ibarras asking if they wanted more. The 
stence of conflicting testimony in the instant case does not 
.der the evidence pointing towards defendant's guilt 
uff icient. It is tl'1.e jury's prerogative to weigh the 
dibil ity of the witnesses and determine who to believe. The 
y is not obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to 
defendant rather than that presented in opposition by the 
te, and the existence of contradictory evidence does not 
rant this Court's reversal of the verdict. State y. Howell, 
.h, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). This Court has maintained that its 
ction upon review is not to determine the "weight to give 
1flicting evidence, the credibility of the witnesses or the 
ght to be given defendant's testimony.• State y. Romero, Utah, 
P.2d 216, 218 (1976). 
In the instant case, the jury simply chose not to 
ieve defendant's version of what transpired but instead 
ieved the evidence and reasonable inferences that could be 
Mn therefrom which established defendant's guilt. Therefore, 
' evidence which the jury accepted indicated that defendant, 
>rovoked, pulled a gun on the Ibarras, shot Carlos Ibarra and 
•tinued to waive the gun at his victims while screaming threats 
them. Certainly this evidence is insufficient that 
'"""abJ minrls JIWS.t. have concluded that defendant did not intend 
sh0ut Carlos Ibarra. 
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Finally, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence on the grounds that the state failed to establish by 
medical evidence that defendant's action was likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. However, expert testimony is 
i 
s 
g 
e 
unnecessary to establish matters clearly within the comprehension 
r 
of a jury of laymen. All reasonable persons may, without the aic 
0 
of an expert, comprehend that when one points a gun at another, 
i. 
and indeed shoots that run, they are likely to cause death or 
nl 
In addition there is substantial evidence serious bodily injury. 
apart from any expert testimony, that the defendant caused Carlos 
Ibarra serious bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(9) 
defines serious bodily injury as: 
injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or 
organ or creates a substantial risk 
of death. 
re 
39 
10 
Evidence adduced at trial indicates that Carlos IbarralB 
received a gunshot wound in the leg which bled so profusely that 
Mr. Tatum believed Carlos was bleeding to death. As a result of 
that wound, Carlos spent a week in the hospital receiving medical 
treatment. The jury, without the instruction of an expert, 
reasonably inferred from the evidence that such a wound could 
result in protracted impairment of Carlos' leg and posed a 
substantial risk of death. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to 
establish that defendant was guilty of intentionally causing 
serious bodily injury. 
The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction of aggravated assault on any one of three grounds. 
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irst, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant 
sed a deadly weapon and_ is therefore guilty of two counts of 
ggravated assault under § 76-5-103(1) (bl. Next, because 
efendant wielded a gun he used such means or force likely to 
n 
roduce death or bodily injury and is therefore guilty of two 
d 
ounts of aggravated assault under§ 76-2-103(1) (bl. And, 
e, 
inally, the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant 
ntentionally caused derious bodily injury to Carlos Ibarra. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the trial court 
roperly excluded defendant's hearsay testimony and the evidence 
as sufficient to support the jury's verdict of two counts of 
3gravated assault. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court 
1ould be affirmed. 
Respectfully 
a ms. 
0 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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